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Defining the Term "Valid Existing
Rights" in Section 522(e) of Surface
Mining Control And Reclamation Act
of 1977 To Avoid Takings Under the
Just Compensation Clause
By DAVID TORBETT*
Section 522 of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977' (the Act) is a legislative plan intended to allow the
designation of certain general land areas as unsuitable for surface
or deep coal mining or both and to prohibit creation of new
rights to mine in certain areas after passage of the Act. The
reasons for passage are not specifically declared in the Act, but
are set out in the legislative history contained in the Committee
Report 2 (the Report).
The purpose of this article is to provide an interpretation of
the term "valid existing rights" (VER) in Section 522(e) which
comports with the intention of Congress as demonstrated by the
express language and the legislative history of the Act. The
explanations contained in the Report for Sections 522(e) and
522(a)-(d) should be considered in pari materia. Sections 522(e)
and 522(a)-(d) are mutually dependent and help explain each
other. Because of this relationship, it is necessary to consider
both the Report and Section 522 in their entirety.
A COMPARISON OF SECTIONS 522(e) AND 522(a)-(d)
Subsections (a)-(d) of Section 522 authorize regulatory agen-
cies to designate certain areas as unsuitable for mining and,
* David Torbett is currently an Administrative Law Judge with the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Knoxville, Tennessee; formerly
Deputy Director, OHA, Arlington, Virginia; and formerly Circuit Judge, 1st Judicial
Circuit of Tennessee. The views expressed herein are those of the author alone. The
author wishes to express his appreciation to his clerk, Angie LeClercq, for her excellent
assistance in the research and editing of this essay.
I Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 30 of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87,
91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1201-1328 (1988)).
2 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 630-32.
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW & POLICY
thus, to limit or ban mining in those areas. Under Sections
522(a)-(d) regulatory agencies are not required to designate any
area as unsuitable for mining, but the procedure for such des-
ignation must exist in order for a regulatory agency to have an
approved program. Certain procedures and criteria must be met
before any particular area is designated as unsuitable for min-
ing.' According to the legislative history, Sections 522(a)-(d) are
to provide discretionary standards to be flexibly applied.
4
On the other hand, Section 522(e) is an outright congres-
sional ban on mining in certain areas subject to "valid existing
rights" (VER).5 Section 522, in its entirety, provides a statutory
basis for a land use or zoning law for surface coal mining. The
purpose of Section 522 is clear and undisputed. The power of
Congress to create such a plan is settled. 6 However, there is a
significant, unresolved question: what definition and application
should be given the term "valid existing rights"? Still unresolved
are the types of rights to mine and remove coal which must have
existed when the Act was passed in order for them to be clas-
sified "valid existing rights".
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTIONS 522(e) AND 522(a)-(d)
The term, "valid existing rights", was created administra-
tively and judicially. The term may be defined as a perfected
30 U.S.C. §§ 1272(a)-(d)(1988):
(a)(l) To be eligible to assume regulatory authority ... each state shall establish a
planning process enabling objective decisions based upon competent and scientifically
sound data and information as to which, if any, land areas of a state are unsuitable for
all or certain types of surface coal mining operations pursuant to the standards set forth
in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subsection .... (2) Upon petition ... the state
regulatory authority shall designate an areas as unsuitable for all or certain types of
surface coal mining operations if the state regulatory authority determines that recla-
mation pursuant to the requirements of this Act is not technologically and economically
feasible. (3) Upon petition pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, a surface area may
be designated unsuitable for certain types of surface coal mining operations if such
operations will- . . [here are set forth the seven criteria].
4 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 630-31.
1 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1988):
After the enactment of this Act and subject to valid existing rights no surface coal
mining operations except those which exist on the date of enactment of the Act shall be
permitted-(l) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park System
.. ; (2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest . . .; (3)
which will adversely affect any publicly owned park .. . ; (4) within one hundred feet
of the outside right-of-way line of any public road . . .; (5) within three hundred feet
form any occupied dwelling ....
6 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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property right or an unperfected property right which may be
perfected by the non-discretionary acts of government officials.'
That Congress was aware of this traditional definition of "valid
existing rights" is manifest from the Report.' The committee
cited and relied upon the authority of United States vs. Polino,9
to assure that no new definition of "valid existing rights" would
be created by the Executive Branch.10 Congress emphasized that
the term "subject to valid existing rights" was "subject to
previous court interpretations of valid existing rights and shall
not be defined to allow the creation of a right to strip mine
where such right did not already exist by virtue of state law.""
Congress knew the traditional definition of "valid existing
rights", and specifically restricted its expansion. 2 Thus, Con-
gress did not intend the Executive Branch to narrow the defini-
tion of "valid existing rights".
The authors of the "all permits" test' 3appear to have con-
cluded that Congress intended the creation of a heretofore un-
known definition of "valid existing rights". 4 The new definition
7 Laitos & Westfall, Government Interference With Private Interests in Public
Resources, Ii HAv. Eva. L. REv. 1, 12-30 (1987). The authors describe a hierarchy
of six types of private interests that may be acquired from the United States. The ability
of an interest to withstand a law meant to abolish it depends on where the interest lies
within that hierarchy. The six interests include: vested rights (fees), nonvested protectable
property rights (leaseholds), protected possessory interests (unpatented mining claims),
non-discretionary entitlements (applications where there is no discretionary right to
reject), rights of possession (occupation, use) and discretionary applications. The authors
conclude that valid existing rights generally include perfected property rights or those
that may be perfected by the non-discretionary acts of government officials.
H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 632.
1 131 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. W.Va. 1955).
10 H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, at 632.
1 Id. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (the property interest in employ-
ment protected against interference by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is derived from state law).
12 Id.
11 44 Fed. Reg. 14,990, 14,993 (1979).
14 Id. The all permits test required that two tests be met to establish "valid existing
rights". Coal production must have been authorized by property rights in existence on
August 3, 1977, that were created by a legally binding conveyance, deed, liaison contract
and the operator must have received all necessary permits to mine by August 3, 1977.
This rule was later administratively modified to allow permit applicants to claim VER
in those areas for which a "good faith effort" had been made to obtain "all permits"
prior to the effective date of the Act. Office of Surface Mining, U.S. Dep't of Interior,
Temporary Directive 90-03, Interim Procedures for Determining of Valid Existing Rights
(1989).
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of "valid existing rights" under the "all permits" test would
substantially narrow the traditional scope of valid existing rights.
Under the "all permits" approach, there would be virtually no*
situation where mining would be allowed in one of the prohibited
areas of Section 522(e). The "all permits" test was intended to
deny owners of coal reserves in Section 522(e) prohibited areas
the right to mine these reserves. More significantly, those owners
would receive no public compensation for their loss. In my
opinion, the Act and the legislative history do not support the
"all permits" interpretation of "valid existing rights". To the
contrary, they support the conclusion that "valid existing rights"
should be defined in the traditional manner. The legislative
history of the Act makes clear that Congress knew and relied
upon the traditional definition of "valid existing rights". The
"all permits" approach is, thus, obviously inconsistent with the
intent of Congress.
Sections 522(a)-(d) establish a balancing test under which the
general welfare of the public (the public good) is to be weighed
against the rights of the mineral owner.15 In referring to Sections
522(a)-(d), the Report stated in part:
The committee wishes to emphasize that this section does not
require the designation of areas as unsuitable for surface min-
ing other than where it is demonstrated that reclamation of an
area is not physically or economically feasible under the stan-
dards of the act. The other criteria for designation, which
relate to general planning and environmental concerns, are
discretionary and thus the State could determine that no lands
should be designated thereunder, or, on the other hand, could
prohibit all or some types of surface mining entirely. In ad-
dition to the discretionary designation criteria, the designation
process includes other elements of flexibility.1 6 (emphasis added)
The procedure created by Congress has proper safeguards to
protect the rights of all, including the rights of the mineral
owner:
For example, the designation of unsuitability will not neces-
sarily result in a prohibition of mining. The designation can
merely limit specific types of mining and thus the coal resource
" H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMrN. NEWS, 630-31.
16 Id. (emphasis added).
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may still be extracted by a mining technology which would
protect the values upon which the designation is premised. In
addition, after an area is designated, coal development is not
totally precluded as exploration for coal may continue. More-
over, any interested person may petition for termination of a
designation. '7
The Report stated that where persons had made "substantial
legal and financial commitments" mining might continue in an
area that would otherwise have been designated as unsuitable.
The Congress was obviously influenced by the justifiable reliance
interests which owners of mineral rights may have established
through substantial expenditures on given sites. But the legisla-
tive history of Sections 522(a)-(d) makes clear that "mere own-
ership or acquisition costs of the coal itself or the right to mine
it does not constitute 'substantial legal and financial commit-
ments'"'."
Under the balancing test of Sections 522(a)-(d), the owner
of coal mineral rights may in certain cases legitimately be de-
prived of the right to mine those rights without subjecting the
regulatory authority to payment of compensation. This result
would be compatible with the way many zoning and land use
laws are traditionally implemented.' 9 The approach of the land
use and zoning cases has been followed in some mining cases.
20
The legislative history establishes that the designation process is
structured to be applied on an area basis, rather than site by
site. 2' Following public hearings and review of comments, the
regulatory authority is authorized to engage in "rational plan-
ning", which could have the effect of limiting or prohibiting
mining in certain areas:
The process for designation of land areas as unsuitable for
surface coal mining is also premised on the notion that suc-
'7 Id.
I Id.
, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962).
1 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn.
v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (1985) (upholding statutes and regulations protecting surface
owners from subsidence damage); Copper Valley Machine Works v. Andrus, 653 F.2d
595, 601 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding Secretarial discretion to suspend an oil and gas
lease in the interest of protecting fragile Alaskan tundra).
1, H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 630-31.
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cessful management of surface mining depends, in large part,
on the application of rational planning principles. While coal
surface mining may be an important and productive use of
land, it also involves certain hazards and is but one of many
alternative land uses. In some circumstances, therefore, coal
surface mining should give away to competing uses of higher
benefit. Section 522 establishes a program by which such de-
cisions can be made.
22
While Sections 522(a)-(d) use a balancing test to resolve
rights, Section 522(e) erects a complete bar in certain circum-
stances. Looking then at the Report as it relates to Section
522(e):
Although the designation process will serve to limit mining
where such activity is inconsistent with rational planning in the
opinion of the committee, the decision to bar surface mining
in certain circumstances is better made by Congress itself. Thus
section 522(e) provides that subject to valid existing rights, no
surface coal mining operation except those in existence on the
date of enactment shall be permitted on lands within the
boundaries of the units of certain Federal systems such as the
national park system, national wildlife refuge system, on Fed-
eral lands within the boundaries of any national forest (except
in those circumstances set forth in Sec. 522(c) of the committee
amendment) or in other special circumstances, that is within
100 feet of public roads, 300 feet of public buildings or churches,
or 100 feet of a cemetery. 23 (emphasis added)
Congress concluded that irrespective of the balance between
the rights of mineral owners and those of the public, mining
shall not take place in certain areas. Congress surely has the
right to do this. 24 Because Congress did not wish to create
compensable takings, Congress limited its regulatory designation
to situations in which "valid existing rights" would not be
compromised and no taking would occur.
To comprehend fully the legislative history, the rationale for
Section 522(e) must be juxtaposed with that of Sections 522(a)-
(d). Congress could not have intended otherwise. The balancing
of rights is the moving force in the enactment of Sections 522(a)-
(d), while Section 522(e) is an outright bar under certain circum-
22 Id at 630.
23 Id at 631. [emphasis added]
- Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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stances. Thus, "mere ownership or acquisition costs of the coal
itself or the right to mine" do not constitute "substantial, legal
and financial commitments" in Sections 522(a)-(d). On the other
hand, absent a balancing test "mere ownership or acquisition
costs of the coal itself or the right to mine" will constitute a
valid existing right in Section 522(e).
IDENTIFYING VALID EXISTING PROPERTY RIGHTS
Congress realized that it could not absolutely ban mining in
national parks or the national forests without paying for the
outstanding mineral rights. Much of the national forests were
obtained through condemnation proceedings or purchase. In
many cases it was specifically understood at the time of acqui-
sition that the mineral rights were not being condemned or
purchased, and further that the right to seek and remove these
minerals by the mineral owners was not taken.
25
Section 522(e) provides, even without valid existing rights,
that certain deep mining in national forests is allowed if "the
Secretary finds that there is no significant recreational, timber,
economic, or other values which may be incompatible" with the
surface operations incident to an underground mine. 26 This bal-
ancing test may be alleged to be comparable to that underlying
Sections 522(a)-(d). This perception is flawed, however, because
it was the acquisition of the mineral owners' surface rights that
created the national forests.
Stated in plain language, the government, when it acquired
the surface rights of certain areas for the national forests, ac-
quired only part of the bundle of property rights in those areas.
A congressional declaration that the mining of these areas is
banned because it is incompatible with the government's rights
as surface owner does not properly balance the rights of the
mineral owners and the public. To the contrary, such a dispo-
sition is hardly more than a self serving effort on the part of an
25 Sunday Creek Coal Co., v. Hodel, No. C-2-88-0416, slip op. (S.D. Ohio, Feb.
2, 1988) (the 1941 deed of conveyance of a 220-acre tract specifically reserved the mineral
rights in the realty and the right to remove by surface mining. In 1970, the U.S. Forest
Service purchased surface rights. The conveyance was made subject to "all mineral
interests of record in third parties"); Blackmore Co., Hagan Estates, Inc., IBLA 87-260
(March 20, 1989) (the 1937 condemnation of 9,973 acres by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Forest Service was "subject to a mineral reservation which gave Hagan the
right to mine all valuable minerals, including coal.
30 U.S.C. 1272(e)(2)(1988).
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owner of partial rights in land-the government-to acquire the
partial rights of another owner in the same land by denying the
latter owner beneficial use of his limited property right- the
right to mine coal. When the Federal government purchases or
condemns property but leaves the mineral rights outstanding,
the owner of mineral rights is left with a vested property right
in the extraction of minerals. Were the government subsequently
to ban extraction of these minerals, that ban constitutes a com-
pensable taking. 27 To avoid such "takings", Congress made its
absolute ban on mining in 522(e) areas subject to "valid existing
rights".
The legislative history and the Act shows Congress' plan.
First, there is an intent to create a land use system in which
certain areas, not specific sites, could be designated as unsuitable
for surface or deep mining or both. In some circumstances this
may mean that mineral owners would be denied authority to
extract minerals without receiving compensation. Such a result
would be compatible with the zoning cases. Second, the plan is
intended to fix the status quo in Section 522(e) areas by a ban
of mining, subject only to "valid existing rights". The intention
is that no new right to mine, particularly to strip mine, can be
created after passage of the Act.
THE FLAW IN THE "ALL PERMITS TEST"
The "all permits test" provided two reasons for abandoning
the traditional definition of "valid existing rights". 2 First, the
"valid existing rights" concept had previously been applied only
to federal land, not to private land. The concept had been
developed in case law which related to federal leases, homestead-
ing and mining of public land, not private land. As a result, the
27 Many cases have found a taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments under these circumstances: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 394 (1922); Florida Rock Industries v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding that a taking may have occurred and remanding to determine the " . . .
relationship of the owner's basis or investment, and the fair market value before the
alleged taking, to the market value after the alleged taking."); Whitney Benefits v.
United States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (remanding to determine whether a
taking had occurred under 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5)); Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d
932 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (a taking can occur by a valid regulation with no physical invasion);
Foster v. United States, 607 F.2d 943, 950 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (found a taking when the
government withheld access to plaintiff's mineral deposits).
2 44 Fed. Reg. 14,990 and 14,993 (1979).
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"all permits test" drew the faulty analogy that the case law
"does not apply to situations of private coal ownership. ' 29 That
conclusion is impermissible. It is, at best, a distinction without
a difference. At worst, it implies that the absolute ownership of
mineral rights in private land is inferior to unperfected ownership
of mineral rights in federal land. The reason that the term "valid
existing rights" has only recently been used in relation to private
property is that it was thought that private property was consti-
tutionally protected (to paraphrase James Madison's metaphor
from the Federalist papers) by the binding of even the federal
leviathan with the chains of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The second rationale for the "all permits test" states:
[T]his act changed the context of valid existing rights signifi-
cantly because it makes clear that surface coal mining on any
private or federal land is not an absolute right but is subject
to approval after regulatory authority determines that recla-
mation to the standards of the act can be achieved. Thus, at
least as of the enactment of the Act, landowners no longer
have an unconditional right to mine.30
This analysis is flawed. The idea that the surface mining act
is discretionary was espoused by Secretary Watt in Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc., v. Clark.3 1 Secretary Watt's theory
was rejected by Judge Barrington Parker.
3 2
Mineral owners, in fact, have an absolute right to mine their
coal if they meet the requirements of the regulations.33 The
regulatory authority lacks discretion to deny a surface mining
permit if an applicant meets the requirements of the Act. The
regulatory authority exercises judgment, but these judgments
29 Id.
30 Id.
11 Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc., v. Clark, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1217 (Jan. 31, 1985).
32 Id.
11 Laitos and Westfall, Government Interference With Private Interests in Public
Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 25-31 (1987). The authors distinguish, for the
purpose of finding "valid existing rights", between acquisition of those rights by the
non-discretionary acts of government officials and discretionary acts. "When a private
party has met all the statutory conditions precedent to obtaining a property interest
from the United States, neither Congress nor the executive may deprive the private party
of the interest."
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must be rational, that is to say, lawful.34 Once the regulatory
authority has made a rational judgment that the permit applicant
has either met or failed to meet the regulations, the permit, in
my opinion, must be issued or denied.
The Environmental Protection Act contains a subsection au-
thorizing the EPA administrator to prohibit mining in certain
wetlands if the public would not be well served by the granting
of a permit." In Florida Rock Industries6the EPA administrator
refused to issue a permit-even though the mining in question
would cause no significant pollution. The court held that this
constituted a compensable taking.
VALID EXISTING RIGHTS PER SECTION 522(e)
The term "subject to valid existing rights" appears only once
in Section 522(e)-in the first sentence. The first sentence in
which the term, "subject to valid existing rights" appears, con-
stitutes the beginning of each succeeding sentence describing the
class of property whereon mining is prohibited. Thus, it would
violate grammatical rules as well as logic to allow the promul-
gation of separate definitions of "valid existing rights" for the
separate classes of property in Section 522(e). Within its federal
police power Congress could easily have passed an outright ban
on mining within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling or a public
building as a noxious use. 37 Congress, however, made its ban on
mining of different classes of Section 522(e) property subject to
an identical exception: "valid existing rights".
The Act and regulations set minimum standards which may
be made more stringent by state regulatory authorities.18 Thus,
a state which uses the "all permits" definition of "valid existing
rights" is free to retain that definition. Of course, it is the
' Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. OSMRE, IBSMA 81, 83, aff'd. on
other grounds, 89 IBLA 1 (1985).
11 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500
86 Stat. 816 § 101(a)(l), (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)).
16 Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
37 See supra notes 19 and 20.
3 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(2)(1988): "... which sanctions shall meet the
minimum requirements of this Act .... "; 30 U.S.C. § 1256(b)(1988): "[A]ny provision
of any state law or regulations . .. which provides for more stringent land use and
environmental controls and regulations of surface coal mining and reclamation operation
than do the provisions of this Act or any regulation issued pursuant thereto shall not
be construed to be inconsistent with this Act."
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regulatory authority, be it the state or the federal government,
that will be subject to the payment of compensation, if the
regulatory authority restricts access by the owner of mineral
rights sufficiently to constitute a compensable taking.
In Florida Rock Industries the Court stated that the fact that
a regulation resulted in a compensable taking did not ipso facto
invalidate the regulation. Further, there are numerous cases which
state that a law will not be declared unconstitutional because it
might result in a compensable taking. 9 In Hodel the Supreme
Court stated that a party has standing to challenge the Act as a
Fifth Amendment taking only when the law as applied amounts
to a taking of complainant's property.4 Under Florida Rock
Industries and Hodel, it is important that any new regulation
defining "valid existing rights" reflect the intent of Congress to
avoid compensable takings. Once the new regulation is promul-
gated, it must be attacked directly for there to be a holding of
facial invalidity. But in a facial attack, the fact that the regu-
lation might result in a compensable taking is insufficient to
invalidate a rule which is susceptible to any saving constitutional
application. In subsequent "taking" proceedings, the regulation
will not be invalidated just because it results in the taking. This
potential catch 22 situation could completely frustrate the inten-
tion of Congress to avoid compensable takings of private prop-
erty.
The Department should adopt Option 141as a definition of
valid existing rights. Option 1 is the only option which truly
19 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding exclusion of lottery tickets
from interstate commerce). These cases establish a federal police power limited primarily
by the political controls the people exercise over the members of Congress through
elections. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). But cf. National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985); In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897) (upholding federal tax the effect of
which was to prohibit the sale of colored oleomargarine within the United States).
- Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 294-297
(1981).
41 53 Fed. Reg. 52,383 (1988). Option 1 of the proposed rulemaking would require
that a person meet the following criteria to demonstrate "valid existing rights" for a
particular parcel or mineral interest:
(I) a legally binding conveyance, lease, deed, contract, or other document which estab-
lishes a right to the coal resource as of August 3, 1977; or as of the date the prohibitions
became effective for lands that came within the Section 522(e) protection at a subsequent
date; and
(2) the person can demonstrate that as of the date the Section 522(e) prohibitions became
effective, he had, as determined by the laws of the state in which the mining would
occur, the right to extract the coal by the method he intends to use ....
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reflects the intent of Congress. Option 1, moreover, presents
few administrative difficulties. Regulatory authorities, in all cases,
must make a determination as to whether a permit applicant has
the right to mine by the method intended in the area encom-
passed by the application.4 2 This involves a determination by the
regulatory authority of the nature of the applicant's property
rights. 4 The right to strip mine or mine by any method is a part
of the whole bundle of property rights.
Option I essentially defines "valid existing rights" as prop-
erty rights, and all coal reserves not publicly owned are privately-
owned property and thus come within the definition of "valid
existing rights". The question can then be asked: Has Congress
through Section 522(e) accomplished anything? Perhaps not. As
of the date of the passage of the Act, some entity or entities
had a "valid existing right" to mine all privately owned coal in
Section 522(e) areas. Option 1 protects this right. The bundle of
property rights (i.e. mineral rights, surface rights, the right to
deep mine, strip mine, longwall mine, etc.) may be divided in
many different ways between many different owners, but the
Act did not change or eliminate any of these property rights.
44
It would appear that the only effect of an Option 1 definition
of VER would be to limit the transferability of those rights.
This would be of questionable constitutionality and value. If the
"valid existing right" to mine coal cannot be sold by its owner,
the owner of that right can mine the coal himself. Thus, Section
,2 30 C.F.R. § 778.15(b)(2) (1988). This regulation requires only that permit ap-
plicants submit proof of the right to strip mine. However, if, for instance, surface
owners contest the applicants' right to longwall mine, this issue will be subject to
administrative determination and possibly administrative litigation.
41 Property rights and contract issues will probably be decided under state law.
See United States v. Polino, 131 F. Supp. 722 (1955). But cf. Textile Union Workers of
America v. Union Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (grant of federal jurisdiction under Labor
Relations Act to federal courts sufficient to allow federal courts to develop a federal
contract law of labor relations often by borrowing state contract law).
- H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, 189 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 593, 718-19. (Separate views of Congressman Manuel
Lujan, Jr.: "clearly alienation by sale, assignment, gift or inheritance of the property
right of the coal is not affected by the Act nor is the legal right to mine coal in any
way modified if such right existed prior to enactment of the Act"). Surface Mining
Control Act of 1975, H.R. Res. 304, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 6676, 6679
(1975). In House debates, Congressman Latta of Ohio asked whether the bill would
"affect the mineral rights" of private citizens. Congressman Udall replied: "This is a
bill that deals with how one mines coal in that situation and every other situation, but
we do not attempt to change property rights in the situation the gentlemen talks about
and thus the mineral rights are not affected."
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AVOIDING TAKINGS
522(e) does not effectively bar mining in any Section 522(e) area.
It is quite obvious that Congress wanted (not to be confused
with intended) to bar coal companies from acquiring new rights
to mine in Section 522(e) areas as of the date of the passage of
the Act. Congress also wanted to protect the property rights in
those areas. This created an impossible dilemma. The result was
that Congress took with one hand the right to acquire new rights
to mine in Section 522(e) areas and gave with the other hand
protecting "valid existing rights" of the owners of the mineral
interests in Section 522(e) areas.
The term "valid existing rights" has defied definition for
thirteen years. It is my opinion that the reason for this is that
the term is not susceptible to a meaningful definition. Option 1
is the only permissible definition of VER based on the express
language of the Act and its legislative history. Neither Option 1
nor any other proposed option will effectuate the desire of
Congress. The simple fact of the matter is that neither the federal
nor state government can significantly burden "valid existing
rights" without triggering a right to just compensation in favor
of their owners. This is the central meaning of the protection
afforded to property by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution as applied to mineral rights.
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